Is information a sufficient basis for cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske's approach

Abstract:

Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske's approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object -tackled in Part 2 as a separate article-sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely -as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske's approach -handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.

Año de publicación:

2011

Keywords:

• COMMUNICATION
• Waves
• Physics of observation
• COGNITION
• epistemology
• Dretske
• Biophysics
• Theory of perception
• Information content
• Inverse Problem
• signal
• information flow

Fuente:

scopus