Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices
Abstract:
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.
Año de publicación:
2023
Keywords:
- Weighted majority games
- Mergeability
- Power indices
- Axiomatic characterizations
Fuente:


Tipo de documento:
Article
Estado:
Acceso abierto
Áreas de conocimiento:
- Optimización matemática
Áreas temáticas:
- Programación informática, programas, datos, seguridad