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Structural problems of the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution and the authoritarian hyper-presidentialism

Abstract:

This article evaluates the institutional design that emerges out of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 written under the so-called Revolución Ciudadana (Citizen Revolution) (2007-2017). On January 2008, President Rafael Correa instated a new period of the political history in Ecuador that was stretched out until the end of his mandate in May 2017. This period bears the name of Revolución Ciudadana and, among its strategies of power, included the preparation of a new Constitution aiming to re-found the State and to lay the ground for a new way to make politics in benefit of the citizens. The 2008 Constitution brought along several important innovations regarding rights and guarantees at cost of a system of government accused of hyper-presidentialism. Encouraged by the authoritarian and plebiscitarian exercise of power deployed by the President, this criticism was then extended to all the institutional framework of the Constitution. Although an evident reinfor-cement of the presidential powers can be identified, it is my contention that a closer analysis of the Ecuadorian constitutional reality unveils more relevant factors that account for the authoritarian turn of the government and, thus, the weakening of the Rule of Law and democracy.