Regulatory quality concerning carbon dioxide emissions in conjunction with the impact of fiscal decentralization.


Abstract:

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Global carbon dioxide emissions have risen sharply in recent decades, sparking debate on the role of fiscal decentralization in environmental outcomes. Some argue that local autonomy fosters innovation and accountability, while others highlight risks of regulatory fragmentation and a “race to the bottom.” This study aimed to explore the relationship between fiscal decentralization and carbon dioxide emissions, particularly highlighting the frequently overlooked role of regulatory quality, which has often been disregarded in past studies. METHODS: A panel dataset of 73 countries (1990–2019) were analysed using indicators of fiscal decentralization (subnational expenditure, revenue, and vertical fiscal imbalance) from the International Monetary Fund’s fiscal federalism database. Carbon dioxide emissions were measured per capita and per unit of gross domestic product to …

Año de publicación:

2025

Keywords:

  • ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
  • Institutional efficiency
  • Intergovernmental coordination
  • Panel data analysis
  • Sustainable Development

Fuente:

scopusscopus
googlegoogle
orcidorcid

Tipo de documento:

Article

Estado:

Acceso abierto

Áreas de conocimiento:

  • Ciencia ambiental
  • Política pública
  • Carbono
  • Política pública
  • Política pública
  • Carbono
  • Contaminación

Áreas temáticas de Dewey:

  • Producción
  • Finanzas públicas
  • Otros problemas y servicios sociales
  • Producción
  • Finanzas públicas
  • Otros problemas y servicios sociales
  • Economía de la tierra y la energía
  • Consideraciones generales de la administración pública
Procesado con IAProcesado con IA

Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible:

  • ODS 17: Alianzas para lograr los objetivos
  • ODS 7: Energía asequible y no contaminante
  • ODS 12: Producción y consumo responsables
  • ODS 9: Industria, innovación e infraestructura
Procesado con IAProcesado con IA